Unjustified Liability for Accommodation Endorsers by Kuenzel, Calvin A.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
1-1-1966
Unjustified Liability for Accommodation
Endorsers
Calvin A. Kuenzel
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Leading Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Calvin A. Kuenzel, Unjustified Liability for Accommodation Endorsers, 21 U. Miami L. Rev. 410 (1966)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol21/iss2/4
UNJUSTIFIED LIABILITY FOR ACCOMMODATION
ENDORSERS
CALVIN A. KUENZEL*
A. LIABILITY PRIOR TO THE NIL ............................................... 410
B. THE NIL PRov ISIoNs ...................................................... 411
C. CENTRAL BANK & TRUST CO. v. MELTZER ......................................... 415
D. W EINSTEIN V. SUSSKIND .................................................... 417
E. PRESENT AND FUTURE TRANSACTIONS ......................................... 418
F. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................. 422
Two decisions of the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida'
merit comment, for they mistakenly hold accommodation endorsers
liable under circumstances which clearly should have resulted in a dis-
charge of liability under the Negotiable Instruments Law.2 One of the
decisions holds that performance of the conditions of presentment for
payment and notice of dishonor, normally prerequisites to the imposition
of liability in the absence of waiver, are unnecessary to hold an accomo-
modation endorser liable. Both cases hold that acts which under the NIL
constitute a discharge of secondary parties do not discharge an endorser
when he assumes the status of a surety by endorsing a negotiable promis-
sory note. While it is possible under certain circumstances to reach these
results, both decisions are clearly erroneous on their facts.
To explain briefly how the initial mistake was made is not difficult.
The district court erroneously assumed that since the decision in Camp
v. First Nat'l Bank' was rendered subsequent to the enactment of the
NIL in Florida, the case must necessarily involve an interpretation of
the NIL. Elaboration is required to clarify what followed that assumption.
A. LIABILITY PRIOR TO THE NIL
Prior to the enactment of the NIL there was a conflict of authority
in this country concerning the nature of an accommodation endorser's
liability.4 Having signed the back of an instrument prior to its delivery
to the payee, this party was held liable in various capacities. The Florida
Supreme Court took the position that the liability was that of a maker.5
In Camp v. First Nat'l Bank,' defendants put their names on the back
of a note prior to its delivery to the payee for the purpose of lending their
credit to the instrument. It was held that:
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law, St. Petersburg, Florida.
1. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Meltzer, 145 So.2d 766 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Weinstein
v. Susskind, 162 So.2d 683 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
2. FLA. STAT. ch. 674-676 (1963), enacted in Florida in 1897 (hereinafter cited NIL).
3. 44 Fla. 497, 33 So. 241 (1902).
4. BRITTON, BILLS & NOTES § 231 (2d ed. 1961).
5. McCallum v. Driggs, 35 Fla. 277, 17 So. 407 (1895); Melton v. Brown, 25 Fla. 461,
6 So. 211 (1889).
6. 44 Fla. 497, 33 So. 241 (1902).
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[U]nder such circumstances it is the settled rule in this state
that they are liable as makers, even although it be proved that
they wrote their names on the back of the note as sureties for
the maker, and without participating in the consideration for
which the note was given. Melton v. Brown, 25 Fla. 461, 6 So.
211; McCallum v. Driggs, 35 Fla. 277, 17 So. 407. Under the
rule adopted, the status of such irregular endorsers as joint
makers is conclusively fixed when it is made to appear that their
signatures are affixed before delivery of the instrument, and for
the purpose of lending their credit thereto with the payee ... '
An additional reason urged in the Camp case for discharging the
surety-endorser was that the payee bank had failed to apply funds of
the maker on deposit with the payee (the First National Bank of Ocala)
to the satisfaction of the obligation and that consequently this conduct
resulted in discharge of the surety-endorser. The court, however, held
that the payee was not prejudiced in his rights against the surety by its
failure to apply maker's funds on deposit even though the note was
payable at the bank.
The right of a bank to apply a depositor's credit balance to the
satisfaction of a debt due the bank is in the nature of a set-off,
or application of payments which will not be required by law,
in the absence of express agreement or appropriation, so as to
benefit a surety.'
The maker in Camp had neither expressly ordered nor expressly autho-
rized, an application.
Although Camp was decided in October 1902 and the NIL was
enacted in Florida in 1897, the NIL provided that the act did not apply
to instruments made and delivered prior to its passage in 1897.' The
instrument in question in the Camp case was a ninety day note, executed
on April 27, 1891. Litigation had commenced as early as 1892 although
the decision was not reached until 1902. Therefore, even though Camp
was subsequent to the enactment of the NIL in point of time, the court
still applied the law of Florida as it existed prior to the adoption of the
NIL. Accordingly, an assumption that Camp altered or interpreted the
NIL is without historical foundation.
B. THE NIL PROVISIONS
One of the major purposes of the NIL was to lay at rest the problem
exemplified by the Camp Case, and the act contained provisions dealing
with the nature of an accommodation endorser's liability and also the
7. Id. at 502-503, 33 So., at 242.
8. Id. at 504, 33 So., at 243.
9. Fla. Laws 1897, ch. 4524. "The provisions of this act do not apply to negotiable in-
struments made and delivered prior to the passage hereof."
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effect of making an instrument payable at a bank. NIL section 674.65
provides:
A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise
than as maker, drawer or acceptor, is deemed an endorser, unless
he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be
bound in some other capacity.
The primary purpose of this section was to create uniformity, and to
establish the liability of a person who prior to its issuance to the payee
signed the instrument on its back as endorser, and not as a maker,
acceptor, or guarantor of payment. This result could, of course, differ
if the signature clearly indicated otherwise. By making such a signer
an endorser, all the law which sprang directly and indirectly from any
and all of the NIL sections determining the legal rights, duties and all
other legal relations of the regular endorser, became incorporated by
reference into NIL action 674.65.10 This means that the liability of such
a signer, unless he indicates otherwise, is conditioned upon due present-
ment for payment," and upon due notice of dishonor. 2 All of the elaborate
provisions of the NIL which declare what facts shall or shall not operate
as due presentment for payment, due notice of dishonor, and protest, are
thus brought into NIL section 674.65. The important fact is that the
law that establishes the legal status of the regular endorser comes in
through NIL section 674.65 to establish the legal status of the irregular
endorser. Of course, the accommodation endorser is also a surety for
someone18 and NIL section 674.66 spells out to whom that liability runs.
Where a person, not otherwise a party to an instrument, places
thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as
endorser, in accordance with the following rules:
1. If the instrument is payable to the order of a third
person, he is liable to the payee and to all subsequent
parties.
2. If the instrument is payable to the order of the maker
or drawer, or is payable to bearer, he is liable to all
parties subsequent to the maker or drawer.
3. If he signs for the accommodation of the payee, he is
liable to all parties subsequent to the payee.
This status of secondary liability of the endorser-surety may be lost
when the surety assumes liability as a maker of the instrument. 4 Under
10. BRiTTOiN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 231.
11. FLA. STAT. § 674.72 (1963).
12. FLA. STAT. § 675.06 (1963).
13. FLA. STAT. § 674.32 (1963).
An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker,
drawer, acceptor or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose
of lending his name to some other person.
14. A surety for a party to a bill or note may sign as an acceptor or maker, or
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this arrangement the surety is primarily liable to the creditor on the
instrument, but the surety arrangement still exists, and as between the
principal debtor and the surety, the former and not the latter should
perform.'" This has led some courts to describe the principal debtor as
the "primary party" and the surety as the "secondary party." As can be
imagined, confusion could result when the debt is evidenced by the
negotiable instrument, for the party "primarily" liable in terms of
suretyship might be secondarily liable under the NIL if he was an
endorser of the instrument. Also, a person "secondarily" liable in terms
of suretyship might be primarily liable under the NIL if he signed the
instrument as a maker. But the surety is "secondarily" liable both in
the suretyship sense and in the NIL sense when he signs as endorser of
the negotiable instrument, unless he clearly indicates otherwise. 16 Hence,
had the NIL been applicable to Camp, sections 674.65-66 of the NIL
would have been applied to limit the endorser's liability to that of a party
secondarily liable on the instrument.
The argument in Camp that discharge should have resulted because
of the payee-bank's failure to apply maker's funds on deposit to the
obligation was not without precedent. In fact, some pre-NIL courts had
held that even a maker would be discharged if a holder had failed to
avail himself of maker's funds on deposit with a bank, and that bank
subsequently failed.'7 Consequently, it would appear reasonable to
discharge an endorser-surety when the maker's funds available for satis-
faction of the debt were lost because of the holder's inaction. In dealing
with this problem, section 674.72 of the NIL provides:
Presentment for payment is not necessary in order to charge
the person primarily liable on the instrument; but if the instru-
ment is, by its terms, payable at a special place, and he is able
and willing to pay it there at maturity, such ability and willing-
ness are equivalent to a tender of payment upon his part. But
as a drawer or indorser. As a surety, his rights and liabilities are the same irrespec-
tive of the form of his contract. As a primary party to a bill or note, his liability,
obviously, is different from that which it is as a secondary party.
BarrON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 231.
15. SURETYSHIP DEFINED.
Suretyship is the relation which exists where one person has undertaken an
obligation and another person is also under an obligation or other duty to the
obligee, who is entitled to but one performance, and as between the two who are
bound, one rather than the other should perform.
RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 82 (1941).
16. Indicating otherwise is usually accomplished by the endorser surrendering or waiv-
ing his NIL rights of presentment for payment, notice of dishonor and protest. Or he may
"guarantee payment." A waiver provision was incorporated in the Camp case, but since it
was a pre-NIL case, Camp's liability as "maker" existed regardless of the waiver. Neither of
the cases decided by the Third District Court of Appeal to be discussed herein involved a
waiver situation.
17. Wallace v. McConnell, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 136 (1839); Lazier v. Horan, 55 Iowa
75, 7 N.W. 457 (1880).
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except as herein otherwise provided, presentment for payment
is necessary in order to charge the drawer and endorsers.'
To what extent this section was intended to exonerate the maker in case
of damage by bank failure (the major problem in this type of case) is
not explicitly stated in the act. Professor Roscoe Steffen has stated that
the commissioner's notes indicate an intention to adopt the position of
discharging a maker."
There is a further argument under the NIL to support the position
for discharging a maker on failure of the holder to apply deposited
funds when the instrument is made payable at a bank. NIL section 675.04
provides:
Where the instrument is made payable at a bank, it is equivalent
to an order to the bank to pay the same for the account of the
principal debtor thereon.20
The wording of this section provides makers of such instruments
with the following argument: If nihaking the instrument payable at the
bank renders a note the equivalent of an order, the note is the equivalent
of a bill of exchange.2 Therefore, the maker has the liability of a drawer
of a bill, and a failure to meet the conditions necessary to charge a
drawer2 2 now also applies to the maker. This argument was presented
on behalf of a maker in Binghampton Pharmacy v. First Nat'l Bank.2s
The court rejected the argument and stated that this NIL section was
to be interpreted as merely authorizing the bank to make such application,
but would not put the bank under any duty to do so.
This argument has little to do with the liability of the accommodation
endorser of an instrument made payable at a bank. Under NIL section
674.72 presentment for payment is necessary in order to charge the
drawer and endorsers; and if the instrument is by its terms payable at
a special place, (bank or otherwise) and the person primarily liable is
able and willing to pay it there, such ability and willingness are an
equivalent to a tender of payment upon the primary party's part. Under
NIL section 675.28 (2) (d),14 a person secondarily liable on the instrument
is discharged "by a valid tender of payment made a prior party." Section
18. FLA. STAT.. § 674.72 (1963).
19. Steffen, Instruments "Payable at" A Bank, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 55, 66 (1950).
20. FLA. STAT. § 675.04 (1963).
21. FiA. STAT. § 676.01 (1963).
A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing addressed by one person
to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is
addressed to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum
certain in money to order or to bearer.
22. FLA. STAT. 674.72 (1963). "But except as herein otherwise provided, presentment for
payment is necessary in order to charge the drawer and indorsers."
23. 131 Tenn. 711, 176 S.W. 1038 (1915).
24. FLA. STAT. § 675.28(2)(d) (1963).
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675.04 of the NIL is merely one way of indicating the authorization, or
willingness of the maker, necessary for a tender under NIL section
674.72; a position that the Binghampton Pharmacy case recognized.
Again we see the Camp case changed with respect to instruments payable
at banks by the NIL whereby accommodation endorsers are discharged
not only by failure to meet the standard conditions precedent to their
liability, but also by failure when authorized to apply funds to such
instrument under NIL section 675.28(2)(d).
With the foregoing background in mind, one may now consider the
two decisions of the Third District Court of Appeal.
C. CENTRAL BANK & TRUST Co. v. MELTZER 25
On February 18, 1960, Katz executed and delivered to the plaintiff,
Central Bank and Trust Company, his promissory note in the amount
of 10,000 dollars payable to the plaintiff on April 18, 1960, at the bank.
Prior to delivery to the plaintiff, the defendant Meltzer, endorsed the
back of the note as an accommodation endorser. At the time of the execu-
tion of the note, the maker, Katz, had certain funds on deposit with the
plaintiff. The provisions of the note and the deposit contract, which
Irving Katz had signed, gave the plaintiff the right to apply the funds
on deposit against this debt.
On April 18, 1960, the due date of the note, Katz had 27,271.33
dollars on deposit with the plaintiff. Subsequently, Katz withdrew all of
his funds from this account.
Thereafter, plaintiff sued defendant, as accommodation endorser,
for the unpaid balance of 9,000 dollars together with interest, costs and
reasonable attorney's fees. The defendant, Meltzer, set forth the defense
that the plaintiff bank's failure to apply the funds of the maker on deposit
with it at maturity, against the obligation of the maker to the plaintiff,
discharged the defendant endorser from all liability under said note. The
trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the
theory that under NIL section 675.04, the plaintiff was required to apply
the funds of the maker on deposit against his obligation on the note.
On appeal, the court stated that the sole issue presented was whether
the accommodation endorser of a promissory note payable to, and at a
bank, is relieved of liability by the failure of the bank to apply funds on
deposit at maturity in the account of the maker against the note, which
the bank had a right to so apply. The court held that the defendant, as
an accommodation endorser, was not relieved of liability by the failure
of the plaintiff bank to apply the deposited funds against the note payable
to it. The court relied on the following authority for this holding:
25. 145 So.2d 766 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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In Camp v. First National Bank of Ocala, . . . our Supreme
Court, faced with an almost identical factual situation, decided
that the bank had a right, but was not obligated, to apply the
funds on deposit in satisfaction of the note .... The Camp case
was decided in October, 1902, whereas § 675.04 F.S.A., was
first enacted in 1897. . . . Therefore, it cannot be said that
§ 675.04 altered the effect of the Camp decision. Further, while
there appears to be no Florida cases interpreting § 675.04 it is
noted that this section is the same as § 87 of the Uniform Nego-
tiable Instruments Act which has been interpreted simply as
authorizing a bank, at which an instrument is made payable, to
pay same for the account of the principal debtor. It creates a
right but does not impose a duty upon the bank. Binghampton
Pharmacy v. First National Bank, 1915, 131 Tenn. 711, 176
S.W. 1038.26
The basic error in Meltzer was that the court, by failing to recognize
that Camp was a pre-NIL decision, also failed to examine the NIL pro-
visions that distinguish the liability of a maker as opposed to an accom-
modation endorser. Not only did the court completely disregard NIL
section 674.72, providing for discharge of an endorser on failure of
presentment, but it also failed to recognize that Binghampton Pharmacy
established the authorization necessary to constitute the tender which
would result in the endorser's discharge under NIL section 675.28(2) (d).
After failing to distinguish between makers and endorsers, the court
then went on to confuse the terms "endorser" and "surety."
We further point out that the defendant signed this note as an
accommodation endorser before delivery and therefore is
regarded as surety and not an endorser. This rule is unchanged
by §674.65 F.S.A., providing that a person not signing as
maker, drawer or acceptor and not indicating intention to be
bound in another capacity, is an endorser. A surety is an insurer
of the debt and may be sued as a promisor.17
There are two interpretations which may be given to this last sentence.
The apparent implication is that a surety is a person who under every
conceivable circumstance (other than payment by the principal) 21 must
pay the debt. As previously indicated this statement is untrue under the
NIL, particularly with respect to the endorser-surety. If, on the other
hand, the court meant that the liability of a surety is subject to qualifica-
26. Id. at 768.
27. Ibid.
28. Though satisfaction of the obligation by the principal was not stated as a possible
exception to this generalization, it is doubtful that the court would require the endorser-
surety to pay under this circumstance, even though unaware of NIL sections 675.28(2)(a),
675.28(1) (a) and (b) providing for discharge of an endorser on payment by the principal
or an accommodated party.
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tion, the statement is true but meaningless without an examination of
those qualifications or conditions.
Apparently, the court failed to recognize that a suretyship relation
can be created in a number of ways. When the obligation is evidenced
by a negotiable instrument, the contractual relationship that exists may
vary depending upon the manner it is assumed, be it as maker, endorser
or otherwise. As a consequence, "surety" and "endorser" are not exclusive
terms.
Generally stated, a surety is an "insurer" of the debt and may be
sued as a promisor, for indeed he has made a promise by signing the
instrument. But what is the extent or nature of that promissory liability?
To make this determination we are forced to examine the NIL. This the
court failed to do.
To believe that a generalization such as that found in the last
sentence of the court's opinion is a proposition adequate for the handling
of this case recalls to mind a comment Professor Hart made several years
ago in reference to the Supreme Court of the United States:
But few of the Court's opinions, far too few, genuinely illumine
the area of law with which they deal. Other opinions fail even
by much more elementary standards. Issues are ducked which
in good lawyership and good conscience ought not to be ducked.
Technical mistakes are made which ought not to be made....
D. WEINSTEIN V. SUSSKIND 3 °
In the second of the two cases with which this article deals the
court was presented with an opportunity to correct the errors it committed
in Central Bank & Trust v. Meltzer. Rose Weinstein endorsed several
notes of a corporation in which she was the owner of stock. The corpora-
tion was the maker and several corporate officers and stockholders (the
latter group including Rose) endorsed the notes before delivery. Rose
appealed from a circuit court judgment against her for 99,900 dollars
in a suit to collect on three notes totalling 100,000 dollars. She urged
her release from liability on the grounds that holder had failed to properly
present the notes for payment, and had also extended and modified the
terms of the notes without her consent. To the first argument the court
replied:
Returning now to the question of whether or not the appellant
Rose Weinstein was primarily liable on the note, it appears that
she, as a stockholder, endorsed the note of her own corporation
prior to delivery. Under the law as set out in Central Bank and
29. Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 100 (1959).
30. 162 So.2d 683 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
1966]
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Trust Co. v. Meltzer,... Rose Weinstein, as endorser prior to
delivery, was primarily liable on the note.8'
As a consequence, the court held:
Appellant's point directed to an alleged failure of the owner to
properly present the notes for payment is without merit since, as
an accommodation endorser before delivery, the appellant was
primarily liable. No presentment for payment is necessary
in order to hold one primarily liable on a note. 2
With regard to the extension of the terms of the note, the court held:
It is true that the owner failed to enforce payment on the notes
for some five years after the due date but we know of no law
which requires presentment at any specific time after maturity
in order to charge a party primarily liable on a note. 8
If the premise stated was correct, then the conclusion reached was
correct. But the premise that Rose Weinstein was primarily liable was
incorrect for the decision in Central Bank & Trust v. Meltzer was
erroneous. Rather than compounding the error of Central Bank & Trust
v. Meltzer, the court should have referred to the appropriate NIL
sections namely: section 674.01, that the person "primarily" liable on
an instrument is the person who, by the terms of the instrument, is
absolutely required to pay the same, all other parties being "secondarily"
liable; section 674.65, that a person placing his signature upon an instru-
ment otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor, is deemed an endorser
unless he clearly indicates otherwise; section 674.72, that presentment for
payment is necessary in order to charge the drawer and endorsers; and
to section 675.28(2)(e), that a person secondarily liable on the instru-
ment is discharged by any agreement binding upon the holder to extend
the time of payment, unless the right of recourse against such party is
expressly reserved.
Technical mistakes were made which should not have been made, this
time in the amount of 99,000 dollars plus costs.
E. PRESENT AND FUTURE TRANSACTIONS
Because of the unfortunate historical error, and the overlooking of
the appropriate NIL provisions, these two cases are in direct conflict with
a 1907 decision of the supreme court. Why this decision was overlooked
and Camp cited as authority in Meltzer is unknown.
In Baumeister v. Kuntz34 the defendant endorsed several notes prior
31. Id. at 685.
32. Id. at 686.
33. Ibid.
34. 53 Fla. 340, 42 So. 886 (1907).
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to delivery to the payee as accommodation to the maker. When sued on
his endorsement his defense was failure of presentment for payment and
notice of dishonor by the payee. The court held that the endorser had
waived these conditions and therefore was liable. However, the court
clearly stated that in the absence of waiver an accommodation endorser
is discharged under the NIL when the holder fails to present for payment
and give notice of dishonor.
Prior to the enactment of the negotiable instruments law
(chapter 4524, p. 25, Acts 1897), this court held that when a
party who is neither the maker nor the payee of a promissory
note, for the purpose of enabling the maker to raise money on
it, and before the note passes to the payee, endorses said note
in blank (by simply writing his name on the back or any other
part of the note), he thereby became liable as one of the makers
of the note. Melton v. Brown, 25 Fla. 461, 6 So. 211; McCallum
v. Driggs, 35 Fla. 277, 17 So. 407; Camp v. First Nat. Bank, 44
Fla. 497, 33 So. 241.... By the terms of the statute, [NIL]
when a person not otherwise a party to the negotiable instru-
ment places thereon his signature in blank before delivery, his
status is fixed as that of an endorser. Where the statute fixes
the status of a party to a negotiable instrument as being that
of an endorser, parol evidence is not admissible to vary such
status.
Under the statute an endorser of a negotiable promissory
note is not liable thereon, if due presentment is not made to the
maker for payment, and notice of dishonor is not given, unless
such presentment and notice are excused, dispensed with, or
waived. The rights of an endorser of a negotiable promissory
note to have due presentment and notice before liability attaches
to him thereon are annexed by law for the benefit of the en-
dorser, and under the terms of the statute such presentment and
notice may be expressly or impliedly waived. . . . Of course, if
presentment for payment be waived, the notice of dishonor to
the endorser is dispensed with. "
Perplexing as these two decisions are to present and future trans-
actions completed under the NIL, it appears that a remedy does exist
in that in an appropriate case the conflict between the two cases and
Baumeister v. Kuntz could be pointed out and the jurisdiction of the
supreme court invoked if necessary.
It remains to be considered what effect the Uniform Commercial
Code86 will have on transactions such as these. The UCC will supersede
the NIL and effect transactions entered into after January 1, 1967.87
35. Id. at 345-7, 42 So., at 887-8.
36. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-254 (hereinafter cited UCC).
37. FS.A. § 680.10-101 (1965).
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Under UCC section 673.3-415(1), "an accommodation party is one
who signs the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his
name to another party to it." The purpose of this section is to make it
clear that an accommodation party is always a surety and that this is
his only distinguishing feature. He only differs from other sureties in
that his liability is on the instrument, and he is a surety for another
party to it. His obligation on the instrument is determined by the capa-
city in which he signs. "An accommodation maker or acceptor is bound
on the instrument without any recourse to his principal, while an
accommodation endorser may be liable only after presentment, notice
of dishonor and protest.""8
Again, an endorser may waive these conditions.8? The words "pay-
ment guaranteed," or equivalent words, added to a signature mean that
the signer promises that if the instrument is not paid when due he will
pay it according to its tenor without resort by the holder to any other
party. When words of guaranty are used, presentment, notice of dishonor
and protest are unnecessary to charge the user of those words. But unless
waived, under the UCC, as under the NIL, failure of presentment would
discharge an accommodation endorser such as Rose Weinstein.
Rose Weinstein's defense under NIL section 675.28(2) (e), providing
for discharge of secondary parties by an extension of time, is now handled
under UCC section 673.3-606 on Impairment of Recourse of Collateral:
The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent
that without such party's consent the holder without express
reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue any person
against whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a
right of recourse or agrees to suspend the right to enforce
against such person the instrument or collateral or otherwise
discharges such person, except that failure or delay in effecting
any required presentment, protest or notice of dishonor with
respect to any such person does not discharge any party as to
presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is effective or un-
necessary ....
The words "any party to the instrument" remove the uncertainty
under the original NIL section 675.28 and make it clear that suretyship
defenses under the UCC are not limited to parties who are "secondarily
liable." Rather, they are available to any party who is in the position of
a surety, having a right of recourse either on or off the instrument, in-
cluding an accommodation maker.4 0 Under the UCC this section would
have been available to Rose had she signed as an accommodation maker
let alone as an accommodation endorser.
38. UCC § 3-415 comment 1.
39. See note 16 supra.
40. UCC § 3-606 comment 1.
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Furthermore, UCC section 673.3-604(3) provides for discharge on
tender of payment, as did NIL section 675.28(2) (d). "Where the maker
or acceptor of an instrument payable otherwise than on demand is able
and ready to pay at every place of payment specified in the instrument
when it is due, it is the equivalent to tender." This section rewords NIL
section 674.72, interpreted by cases such as Binghampton Pharmacy, to
mean that makers and acceptors of notes and drafts payable at a bank
were not discharged by failure of a holder to make due presentment of
such paper at the designated bank. This article reverses that rule, for
under UCC section 673.3-501(2) (c), unless excused, "presentment is
necessary to charge ... the maker of a note payable at a bank." In the
event of a failure to present, UCC section 673.3-502 (1) (b) provides that
any maker of a note payable at a bank who, because the drawee or payor
bank becomes insolvent during the delay is deprived of funds maintained
with the drawer or payor bank to cover the instrument, may discharge his
liability by written assignment to the holder of his rights against the
drawee or payor bank in respect to such funds, but such maker is not
otherwise discharged. In addition, any party making tender of full pay-
ment to a holder when, or after it is due, is discharged to the extent of all
subsequent liability for interest, costs and attorney's fees under UCC
section 673.3-604(1).
As far as the endorser is concerned, under UCC section 673.3-604(3),
"where the maker of an instrument payable otherwise than on demand
is able and ready to pay at every place of payment specified in the
instrument when it is due, it is equivalent to tender." UCC section
673.3-604(2) provides, "The holder's refusal of such tender wholly dis-
charges any party who has a right of recourse against the party making
the tender." An accommodation endorser, having recourse against the
accommodated maker, would therefore be discharged.
The limited discharge of the maker and the total discharge of the
endorser are both dependent upon the existence of a tender. Tender by
domiciling an instrument under UCC section 673.3-604(3) occurs when
there is, (1) ability and (2) readiness of the maker to pay when it is due.
Funds on deposit would indicate the "ability." The "readiness" under
the UCC (or "willingness" as the NIL provides) 4' can of course be
created by expressly ordering or authorizing the bank to pay the instru-
ment when due. In Central National Bank v. Meltzer, both the deposit
contract and the note itself authorized such application of funds, and
the endorser should therefore have been discharged.
However, the NIL and the UCC differ in their treatment of the
situation in which no express order or authorization has been given.
Under NIL section 675.04 making the instrument payable at a bank
41. FLA. STAT. § 674.72 (1963).
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constituted an order, or at least if Binghampton Pharmacy was fol-
lowed, an authorization to pay. Under UCC section 673.3-121 alternative
sections were offered to the states for adoption. Alternative A provided:
A note or acceptance which states that it is payable at a bank
is the equivalent of a draft drawn on the bank payable when it
falls due out of any funds of the maker or acceptor in current
account or otherwise available for such payment.
This alternative clearly indicates that making an instrument payable at
a bank is a tender under UCC section 673.3-604, giving limited discharge
to the maker and discharge to the endorser.
However, under alternative B, which was adopted in Florida:
A note or acceptance which states that it is payable at a bank is
not of itself an order or authorization to the bank to pay it.
This alternative not only does not make an instrument payable at a bank
an order, it is not even an authorization to pay.42 Consequently, unless
such authorization is expressly given by the deposit contract, a provi-
sion of the note or in some other manner, making an instrument payable
at a bank would seemingly not constitute a tender under UCC section
673.3-604. Upon the Legislature's adoption of the alternative B provi-
sion the statement in Meltzer that Florida followed the Binghampton
Pharmacy "authorization" rule has been changed. Therefore, the mere
making of the instrument payable at a bank cannot constitute a tender
under the UCC.
F. CONCLUSION
Professor Grant Gilmore observed:
When a "statute," having been in force for a time, has been in-
terpreted in a series of judicial opinions, those opinions them-
selves become part of the statutory complex: the meaning of the
statute must now be sought not merely in the statutory text but
in the statute plus the cases that have been decided under it."
It is sincerely hoped that Central Bank & Trust v. Meltzer and
Weinstein v. Susskind will not become a part of our "statutory complex"
and that when the problems of these cases are subsequently encountered,
the court will refer to the undefiled text.
42. See UCC § 3-121 comment.
43. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037, 1043 (1961).
